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ABSTRACT
Jevtic, Stefan G. MSECE., Purdue University, August 2017. Network AIS-based
DDoS Attack Detection in SDN Environments with NS-3. Major Professor: Dongsoo
Kim.
With the ever increasing connectivity of and dependency on modern computing
systems, our civilization is becoming ever more susceptible to cyberattack. To combat
this, identifying and disrupting malicious traffic without human intervention becomes
essential to protecting our most important systems. To accomplish this, three main
tasks for an effective intrusion detection system have been identified: monitor network
traffic, categorize and identify anomalous behavior in near real time, and take appro-
priate action against the identified threat. This system leverages distributed SDN
architecture and the principles of Artificial Immune Systems and Self-Organizing
Maps to build a network-based intrusion detection system capable of detecting and
terminating DDoS attacks in progress.
11. INTRODUCTION
The size of the internet sphere has seen explosive growth in the last 10 years, and
the rate of growth is expected to accelerate into the near future [1]. This accelerated
growth is attributed to two main factors: the rise of the Internet of Things (IoT) and
the emergence of cloud computing. The Internet of Things is the term attached to
the growing network of small embedded devices that frequently serve the automation
and security needs of homes and businesses. Designed to send and receive data with
remote logging servers, or to be remotely controllable by a user’s smartphone or web
application software, these devices communicate over IP networks with or without
requiring a human to be in the loop. While this offers increased consumer convenience
and control, it also opens the door to new avenues of cyberattack, as the domain of
potential targets grows and there is less human monitorization.
Much of this growth is attributed to consumer “Internet Connected Things” which
include household appliances, security cameras, televisions, digital video recorders,
and smart electric meters [1]. These devices are broadly connected to the internet
through normal IP networks and thus can send/receive traffic to/from any device
reachable from the internet. As of 2017, few of these devices possess adequate security
measures, and thus are subject to infiltration [2]. Infiltrated or compromised devices
can continue to provide expected consumer function and generally do not give any
indication to the consumer that they have been compromised. Since these devices
have the ability to connect to any remote internet endpoint and are very unlikely to
be discovered once they are, internet connected things perfect candidates for inclusion
into networks of malware infected devices (botnets).
At the other end of the spectrum, cloud computing has evolved as a resource
sharing computing model in which large service providers provide infrastructre (In-
frastructure As A Service), platforms, (Platform As A Service), software (Software
2As A Service), and everything in between as leasable services. These services are
profitable for the service providers once a sufficient level of resource utilization is
reached, and this gives rise to multiple customers sharing resource space at the CPU,
storage, and network levels. This is known as multi-tenancy. This availability has
driven a centralization of enterprise class computing into the cloud computing model,
which offers convenience and quality for businesses. However, this also entails new
challenges as cloud providers contend with the technical and security issues of multi-
tenancy, which open up novel cyberattack methods as potential attackers may now
reside within the same server or even the same physical CPU as their intended victims.
A common and problematic cyberattack is the denial-of-service attack. It is char-
acterized by an attempt by a remote device to send more traffic to a target system
than that system is able to handle. Once this threshold capacity is reached, normal/
benign traffic can no longer be serviced, and the target becomes unavailable for use.
The security community has been able to create effective firewall and filtering tech-
niques to mitigate such DoS attacks, a state of affairs which then caused the attacks
to evolve into distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. DDoS attacks achieve the
same end as their DoS ancestors, but do so by overwhelming the target with requests
from a myriad of source devices called bots. In this way, the true source of the attack
is very difficult to detect, as each attacking device does not send enough individual
traffic to raise firewall/ filtering alarms. The effect, however, is the same: the sum-
mation of all the botnet traffic is enough to render the target resource unavailable.
Effective protection against DDoS attacks remains an open problem in the security
community.
To contend with the technical challenges of resource sharing, most cloud providers
have developed concepts of software-defined networking (SDN) and network virtual-
ization. In contrast with previous packet or circuit switching networks, software
defined networks allow for software management of network traffic. This is enabled
by centrally gathering network traffic information from a management network of dis-
tributed devices capable of monitoring and reporting traffic, then making intelligent
3decisions that lead to the highest resource utilization in the given situation. Because
these networking models are associated with increased traffic metadata, they are well
suited to tackling the problems of cyberattack [3].
This project proposes a system for recognizing and mitigating DDoS attacks in
progress. The system’s distributed detection and intervention strategies are bio-
inspired and take inspiration from the function of human immune systems in detect-
ing and disrupting unknown pathogens. Like its biological counterpart, this AIS is
designed to be highly adaptive by using the distributed monitoring approach afforded
by SDN systems with the malicious pattern generation techniques of a modified arti-
ficial immune system. The system is shown to be capable of being highly effective in
monitoring, detecting, and mitigating unknown DDoS attacks in progress.
1.1 Challenges and Hypothesis
The primary challenges faced in the design of a system effective in mitigating real
world DDoS attack are:
1. Monitor network traffic to level sufficient for the security needs of the specific
application.
2. Detect attack behavior before or when it occurs.
3. Intervene and take most appropriate action against detected threat.
This work hypothesizes that an SDN environment with OFv1.3 switches is capable
of monitoring a cloud environment’s network to a level sufficient to enable an SOM
based AIS model to detect a DDoS attack in progress. Upon successful detection,
the AIS can define a new network policy capable of mitigating the attack and then
instruct the OpenFlow network controller to enforce the attack mitigation policy.
41.2 Proposed System
This work proposes a network-based [] SOM-modified-AIS OpenFlow network ap-
plication to meet the primary challenges of effective DDoS detection and mitigation
in cloud computing environments. The system features collaborative profiling to
meet the distributed monitorization needs of such environments, a time-series toxic-
ity “overwhelm-factor” to model the effect a DDoS attack has on network terminal
equipment, a network capable of simulating a DDoS attack in an SDN network en-
vironment, and a SOM-modified AIS network application to handle attack detection
and the immune response. As a proof of concept, this work implements the SDN
DDoS network, collaborative profiling monitorization scheme, and toxicity modeling
AIS application while assuming a functional SOM block.
52. BACKGROUND
2.1 Denial of Service Attacks
Denial-of-service attacks target an end server by overwhelming its ability to service
application level IP protocol requests. These DDoS attacks can feature a botnet
composed of thousands of bots, each sending just a few HTTP requests per second.
These are not limited to small servers, or a low number of requests, as was the case in
the attack on an Incapsula researcher’s website host in late 2016, which saw a peak of
35,000 requests per second [4]. Given that most midsized websites have a processing
capacity in the 100 requests per second area, even a modestly sized botnet can cause
large problems.
2.1.1 DDoS Attack Types
DDoS attacks take different forms, and the basic types are now introduced. Mod-
ern attacks may not necessarily fall into a single category, but can take elements of
each to develop new types of DDoS attacks.
UDP Flood
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) flooding attacks occur when a botnet overwhelms
the target by sending an IP packets of UDP datagrams at an unserviceable rate [5].
Since UDP transport sockets may be installed on a variety of ports, the target port
is usually random and thus difficult to predict. The behavior of the target is to re-
ceive the UDP datagram, unpack it, and check for an associated application on the
datagram’s destination transport port. After it fails to find such an application, a des-
tination unreachable Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) packet is generated
6and sent back to the attacker. This process of reception, check, and response takes
non-trivial time and compute resources, leading to the resource becoming available if
its processing capacity threshold is crossed.
TCP SYN Flood
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) SYN flooding attacks are the result of a
manipulation and understanding of the TCP three-way-handshake connection initial-
ization process. TCP is a connection-oriented protocol, and features an initial process
to set up the connection. The connection initiator begins by sending a TCP-SYN re-
quest to the connection receiver. Upon reception of the TCP-SYN, the receiver opens
an active port on its system, and usually spawns a new process dedicated to listening
for incoming packets (called the Transmission Control Block (TCB)) [6], and sends a
SYN-ACK back to the initiator, indicating the receiver is ready and listening. Upon
receiving the SYN-ACK, the initiator sends an ACK message and the connection is
established. This is called the three-way-handshake [7].
A TCP-SYN flood attack occurs when attackers flood the target system with TCP-
SYN requests [8]. The target servers handle them in the normal way, dedicating a
port, internal memory, and usually a CPU process to listening for the SYN-ACK.
However, in a TCP-SYN flood attack, the SYN-ACK is never sent, and the target
server is left hanging, listening for a message that will never come. This hanging
persists until a clock timeout occurs, and the TCB is freed. During this hanging
period, if enough TCP-SYN requests have flooded, the server will be unable to grant
a new TCB to a legitimate request, and the server is seen as unresponsive. Given
the more substantial target resources that respond to a TCP-SYN request, flooding
occurs with fewer attack resources than a comparable UDP or ICMP flood [8].
7ICMP (Ping) Flood
Ping floods are a simple type of DDoS attack which see the target flooded with
an unserviceable rate of ICMP echo request packets. Upon reception of an ICMP
echo request, the server reads the source IP address and sends an ICMP echo reply
message to that address. These are relatively quick and easy for a server to generate
and send, so Ping floods generally target a network’s bandwidth rather than the
server’s processing capacity [9]. As is the case with the other types, once a capacity
threshold is reached, the server becomes unresponsive as it cannot be reached due to
network congestion.
ICMP (Smurf) Flood
Smurf floods are another ICMP based attack type. A smurf flood attack, however,
is an indirect type of attack in which the server systems are flooded with ICMP echo
replies rather than ICMP echo requests [9]. This is done when the attacker spoofs the
IP source address in its initial ICMP echo request to be the IP address of its intended
attack victim. The attacker can then broadcast these spoofed echo request messages
to whole networks/sub-networks of legitimate devices. These legitimate devices then
generate and send ICMP echo reply messages to the spoofed source IP address, which
is the address of the intended victim, and an attack occurs. In this way a DDoS attack
can actually originate from a single root source.
2.1.2 DDoS Detection and Mitigation
General approaches to protecting against and mitigating DDoS attacks are well
established [10] and involve the tasks of prevention, detection and filtering, and source
determination. Traditional destination based firewall and filtering methods exist and
have achieved some success [11]. Destination-based methods involve the planting of a
network monitoring resource at the point at which the network connects the protected
8destination. This method does not protect the network as a whole, and usually feature
little to no learning capability. Further, destination-based methods are ill-suited to
the challenges of DDoS in cloud computing environments, where it is prohibitively
impractical to guard each destination individually. Instead, SDN principles allow
for a central agent to have a global view of the network itself and thus allow for
network-based [12] detection methods.
Network-based detection involves distributing a set of network monitors through-
out the network. Each monitor contains attack signatures which the network monitor
seeks to match against the traffic flowing through it. These network monitors oper-
ate similarly to wiretaps, allowing an agent to view the traffic without disrupting it.
Traditional network-based [12] detection also features little to no learning capability,
instead relying on external analyses to create appropriate attack signatures for the
monitors.
2.2 Software Defined Networking
Traditional packet switched networks feature devices that must be manually con-
figured when network changes occur, and cannot adapt on the fly to changes in
topology, congestion, network attack status, or general network policy. These net-
works function, but are expensive to maintain and are not well-suited to operation in
cloud computing environments. Software Defined Networking is an emerging network-
ing paradigm that seeks to give network administrators remote control over network
operations. Such is accomplished by separating computer networks into three disjoint
planes of operation: data, control, and management.
The data plane is composed of the network data traffic a network is intended to
carry. This data is to be intelligently forwarded according to L2 (data link layer)
and L3 (network layer) routing protocols and does not contain any messages or com-
mands intended for the network devices themselves. The data plane simply contains
the network payload. The control plane is composed of the network traffic protocols
9that are used to populate the forwarding tables of the data plane devices. These
are the L2 and L3 protocols that make forwarding decisions at each data plane de-
vice. The management plane contains the software tools, including Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP) based tools, that are used to monitor and configure
network devices [13].
The data and control planes are unified in traditional networks, where network
forwarding devices such as switches and routers operate independently of each other.
In these networks, it is up to the control configuration on each device to ensure
that data plane traffic can proceed as intended. The result is a highly decentralized
network that must be manually configured at the device level to support a given
network topology, routing protocol, or network policy.
Fig. 2.1. Software-Defined Networks in (a) planes, (b) layers, (c)
system design architecture [13].
By contrast, SDN is characterized by a separation of all three planes into disjoint
elements. The data plane and control plane are divorced, and the decision making
power that signifies the control plane is moved to a higher level. This is the controller
level (network operating system level), and is what allows SDN to have a global view
10
of network traffic. Further, this separation allows the management plane to define
network policies and instruct the control plane to enforce them remotely through a
southbound interface. Remote action of this type requires a special control channel
be created between the control plane and the data plane, and this channel is known
as the southbound interface. Given the young stage at which SDN currently is, the
control channel discussion is tightly bound to the control protocol used. This work
is limited to the OpenFlow v1.3 protocol [14], so this channel is generally known as
the OF channel. Once the forwarding devices have received their configurations from
the control plane through the OF channel, they operate as L2/L3 devices, forwarding
traffic according to the instructions received from the controller. This architecture is
shown in Figure 2.1.
Fig. 2.2. OpenFlow-enabled SDN devices [13].
The OpenFlow v1.3 (OFv1.3) SDN protocol is one of the most accepted south-
bound interfaces and features a subnetwork of OFv1.3 switched network devices. The
switches operate on a basic network entity called a flow, to whose belonging a packet
must be determined. Each OFv1.3 switch contains one or more Flow Tables, whose
entries are of the rule, action, statistics tuple seen in Figure 2.2. An incoming packet
may belong to a flow, or it may not. As the incoming packet arrives, it is first applied
to the lowest identity flow table. The match criteria of each flow entry is applied to
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the incoming packet, and if the incoming packet does belong to a flow, the switch
takes the corresponding action(s) to process the packet. If the incoming packet does
not match a flow in the lowest identity flow table, it may be sent to the controller
in a PACKET IN message or it may be dropped, depending on configuration. While
the OFv1.3 switch awaits a response (PACKET OUT), from the controller, it buffers
the packet to minimize traffic disruption [14]. In this way, OFv1.3 switches operate
as both L2 and L3 forwarding devices.
2.3 Cloud Computing
Cloud computing (the cloud) is a network-based [12] computing model that is
characterized by many users sharing resource time on very large compute and net-
work systems [15]. Most cloud users are enterprise class applications whose function
must be wholly independent of the underlying infrastructure, and must further be
logically separated from each other. This model is enabled by the principles of SDN,
machine virtualization, and network virtualization. Virtual machines (VMs) have the
function of physical machines without the limitations of the physical machine’s hard-
ware. There is a performance tradeoff, depending on the mechanism of virtualization
implementation, but broadly the cloud would not be able to function without this
concept. The virtual machines are connected to the virtual machine manager (VMM,
also known as the hypervisor) through a virtual network, composed of virtual network
devices which are kernel services whose software completely mimics the functionality
of physical network devices. In this way, the VMM can create, destroy, maintain, and
migrate virtual machines completely independently of each other through software
means alone [15].
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2.4 Artificial Immune System
An Artificial Immune System (AIS) is a computer system which is inspired by
biological immune systems and features many of their properties [16]. Among these
properties are the abilities to learn, adapt, and tolerate error. The most basic function
an AIS serves is that of classification, as the primary goal of an AIS is to detect
malicious antigens, which include pathogens, toxins, foreign substances, etc. Most
generally, the classification is binary and seeks to classify the unit in question as
“self” or “non-self” and is known as the self-nonself discrimination problem [17].
In biological systems, this classification decision is made by immune cells, and,
once an entity has been classified as an antigen, the immune cells collaborate to
destroy it. In this way, immune cells serve dual purposes: detection and intervention.
Detection is done using a pattern matching process. In this pattern matching process,
detector immune cells classify other cells as antigens if they affirm to match a given
non-self pattern, rather than if they fail to match self patterns. The pattern matching
process involves searching the cell’s surface for a contiguous set of specific chemical
receptors. Because of this, the more non-self space the detector cell’s search pattern
generation method can cover, the more effective the detectors will be at detecting
antigens. The non-self search patterns are generated randomly, and undergo a training
process called negative selection [16] to eliminate those that result in false positives
(classifying self cells as non-self cells). If a detector cell successfully passes the training
process, it is released into the immune system. This results in a system in which cells
are in one of two states: training and released.
In an AIS, the tasks of detection and intervention are split, and the artificial
immune cell’s primary job is distilled down to the job of detection, while the inter-
vention task is left to another component of the system. As a result, these artificial
cells are known as detector agents. Detector agents closely mimic the behavior of
the biological system. They classify based on pattern matching, are randomly gen-
erated, undergo a process of negative selection training, and are only released into
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the production system once they have passed all test criteria. Originally, the pattern
matching process also closely mimicked the biological system and employed a method
of r-contiguous bit string matching [16], but more effective match processes have since
been developed [18] [19] [20] [21] [22]. Upon successful detection of an antigen, the
AIS can take a specific action. This could involve further classification of non-self
cells beyond the initial binary classification, with specific actions being taken based
on this subtype. The normal action process involves destroying the newly discovered
antigen and disseminating the detector to other parts of the distributed system to
prevent against future or distributed attacks. This process is called immunization
and in this way, as threats develop and evolve, the AIS can continue to learn and
improve its set of available detectors beyond the initial set of detectors.
2.5 Self-Organizing Map
A self-organizing map (SOM) is a type of artificial neural network (ANN) [23].
The central component of an ANN is the ability to learn and adapt based on incoming
data. Among the learning process architecture categories are feedforward, feedback,
and unsupervised. SOMs are of the third type: unsupervised. Here, neighboring cells
compete and adjust based on the activities of their neighboring cells, and develop
specific detector patterns as a result. These detector patterns provide a mapping
from a high dimensionality input learning space to a low dimensionality output space
in a process known as dimensionality reduction. Like the other types of ANNs,
SOMs feature two operation states: training and mapping. These operational states
correspond well with the cell states in the AIS.
2.6 Network Simulator 3
Network Simulator 3 (NS-3) is an open-source software network simulator devel-
oped and maintained by the NS-3 Consortium for the purposes of network research
and education [24]. It provides realistic packet and traffic modeling, and is well suited
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to building, configuring, and testing networks that would otherwise be difficult or ex-
pensive to physically build and test. NS-3 operates as a discrete event simulator
based on an event queue. This means network time (also known here as virtual time)
proceeds forward in discrete steps, and proper maintenance of the event queue is
essential to simulation event progress.
NS-3 takes great care to model physical networks as closely as possible. As a result,
simulated network building follows the same basic steps in physical network building.
Simulated network entities called nodes need network devices akin to physical net-
work boxes requiring network interface cards. These network devices may operate on
separate channels and feature realistic propagation delay and loss models, and mo-
bility modeling, all with the highly capable monitoring mechanism that all software
affords. Further, NS-3’s network modeling is realistic enough to support external
network entity integration. This affords the ability to test physical switches, routers,
and hosts using NS-3’s simulated networks though kernal TAP/TUN interfaces [25]
popular with other virtual networking applications.
2.7 Related Work
This section explores related work in developing SDN network-based [12] or AIS
intrusion detection systems (IDSs).
The work of Jha and Archaya [26] builds an AIS-based IDS featuring network-
based [12] monitorization and unsupervised learning they call I3DS. I3DS is built
around the function of two modeling techniques, one probabilistic-based and one
decision tree-based. The probabilistic technique uses a Hidden Markov Model [27]
structure to adaptively learn and provide a preliminary self vs non-self classification
on novel traffic. The decision tree structure then takes the non-self candidate data
and performs a final self non-self classification. I3DS is then compared against other
learning-based IDS techniques (k-means, SOM, etc.) in testing utilizing the KDD
Cup 99 Training Dataset [28] from [29]. I3DS outperforms all competition. Though
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I3DS is purely theoretical, and thus does not offer a network monitoring scheme, it
should be the goal of this work’s SOM module to outperform I3DS in the same test
conditions.
Hong [30] develops a network-based [12] malware detection method that detects
anomalies in Domain Name System (DNS) traffic, rather than IP application traffic.
The method (DTA) uses captured DNS traffic to build two graphs: DNS Lookup and
DNS Failure. DNS Lookup is a weighted bipartite graph [31] whose edge set provides
a mapping from a domain name to its corresponding IP address, and logs the query’s
frequency for a given time period. As DNS Lookup can only contain information
on successful queries, DNS Failure is created to provide a mapping between failed
DNS queries and the hosts originating the query, where the edge weight represents
its frequency. Once created, the graphs are monitored for presentation of well-defined
graph artifacts that are known to correspond with malicious network activity. How-
ever, graph presentation of these artifacts alone is insufficient to complete self non-self
classification, so a decision tree module is included. While this method offers promise,
it is a purely theoretical model and does not offer any kind of network monitoring
scheme. DTA should ultimately be outperformed by the work of this project.
[32] builds an OpenFlow-based DDoS detection method utilizing the SOM tech-
nique. Their SOM is trained using a 6-tuple of native OF switch statistics gathered
from the NOX [33] SDN controller. This 6-tuple is composed of the following features,
1. Average Packets per flow. Due to the general DDoS process of generating many
flows from many sources, each individual flow tends to have a low average
number of packets per flow.
2. Average Bytes per flow. As application DDoS attacks intend to overwhelm
destination terminal equipment resources such as sockets, memory, and CPU
time, DDoS attack packets tend to have lower than average packet byte sizes.
3. Average Duration per flow. This feature is used to decrease the rate of false-
positive events.
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4. Percentage of Pair-flows. Pair-flows are flows that compose the one-way traffic
in a two-way conversation. Most benign application traffic takes place as pair-
flows, while most attack traffic is composed of single-flows, i.e.- does not elicit
a target response. A low percentage of pair-flows may indicate a DDoS attack
in progress.
5. Growth of Single-flows. This feature is related to the percentage of pair-flows.
It is a time rate of change feature that tracks the rate of change in the number
of single flows. As DDoS attacks generally flood a destination with single-flows,
a sharp rise in the rate of single-flows may indicate a DDoS attack in progress.
6. Growth of Different Ports. Since many DDoS attack packets are sent to random
destination ports, a sharp rise in the number of destination ports used may
indicate a DDoS attack in progress.
While effective, [32] does not allow for communication between multiple networks
nor statistical methods which analyze OF switch ports to delineate attacking hosts
from benign hosts. Further, this paper does not address the effects that DDoS attacks
have on SDN controllers themselves.
SDN network architectures offer new tools with which to build network monitoring
and anomaly detection mechanisms, but also cause a shift in the focus of DDoS
attacks from the network forwarding devices to the controller. [34] addresses this
issue by developing a quantity, entropy, which represents the number of PACKET IN
events per protected destination per time unit window. The object of a DDoS attack
against an SDN controller is to overwhelm the OF channel bandwidth or controller
processing capacity by generating an unserviceable number of PACKET IN events.
By quantifying the number of PACKET IN events per host per unit time, attacks of
this type can be monitored and detected. This project is effective in detecting attacks
against SDN controllers and individual hosts, but it has limitations. This work cannot
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handle an attack against a whole subnet, has no communication mechanism for SDN
networks with more than one controller, and does not have a mitigation strategy in
the event of detection.
The work of [35] develops a DDoS blocking application that is not based on the de-
tection of statistical anomalies as most traditional IDSs are. They have identified the
difficulty in developing methods to produce accurate and precise statistical anomaly
detection in the sphere of botnet-based attacks as the project’s primary motivation.
Instead, they show that a technique creating an SDN network application utilizing
native SDN methods can block DDoS attacks when no statistical anomalies can be
found. The network application properties follow:
• Generality. The technique uses only standard OF Application Programming
Interfaces (APIs) and thus can be used in general OF-based SDN environments,
independent of SDN controller.
• Semi-autonomous. The developed network application requires minimal des-
tination server support in an effort to maximize server network and compute
resource utilization.
• POX-based. The network application runs on top of the POX [36] SDN con-
troller.
• Mininet tested. The network application has been tested using the Mininet [37]
network emulator.
While lightweight and effective in their testing environment, this technique is in-
herently limited and not suitable for cloud environments. The main limitation is
in requiring the network application to create a secure channel with the destination
server to be protected. Not only does this violate SDN dataflow principles, it is
neither practical nor desirable in cloud computing environments as the number of
channels scales linearly with the number of destination servers, resulting in unaccept-
able overhead.
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Saurabh and Verma [22] developed a proactive AIS-based anomaly detection and
prevention system. A significant contribution of this system is its development of
evolving, self-tuning detectors and the concept of detector power. The work further
contributes a mechanism that allows detection agents to collaborate to detect and take
action against statistical anomalies. Though they improve upon previous negative-
selection algorithms [16] [19] [20] [21], the learning algorithm on which the AIS is based
in this work is still a supervised learning algorithm. As such, its performance will
always be based on the strength of the training set data it was initially taught with,
and will adapt to new attacks more slowly than unsupervised learning techniques
such as SOM.
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3. CHALLENGES AND HYPOTHESIS
This chapter articulates the general challenges associated with designing a system
capable of detecting DDoS attacks in cloud computing environments, and the spe-
cific challenges in developing and implementing the primary work of the design. It
concludes with a statement of the hypothesis the project intends to affirm.
3.1 Primary Challenges
The primary challenges are those identified as the basic and essential tasks a
general system must perform in order to protect a cloud network from a DDoS attack.
3.1.1 Monitorization
Sufficiently monitoring network behavior is the first challenge to be met. The
network monitoring scheme is the ultimate source of all information from which AIS
decisions are made, so no data down the data pipeline may be of a finer resolution than
the monitoring scheme itself supports. Further, the more network traffic monitoring
data that can be generated, the more applicable the resulting model represents the
network. As cloud virtual networks become more complex and more distributed, no
single network device has a global network view, and destination-based monitoring
becomes infeasible. Instead, network-based [12] monitoring methods composed of
multiple distributed monitoring agents must be implemented.
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3.1.2 Detection
To effectively secure a system from attack, the security system must be able to
accurately and precisely predict when an attack is going to take place, or detect an
attack in progress before damage is done. Due to the imperfect nature of prediction
and detection, an amount of error will invariably exist. There are four types of
detection events [26] [30]:
1. True Positive (TP)– the system detected an event that occurred
2. False Positive (FP)– the system detected an event that did not occur
3. True Negative (TN)– the system did not detect an event that did not occur
4. False Negative (FN)– the system did not detect an event that occurred
The error types are related in a trade-off scheme. To achieve a higher TP rate,
a system would likely experience an increase in FP rate as well. The situation is
the same for FP and FN rates. Based on the type of network traffic, some detection
applications will be more tolerant of certain error types than others. For example, a
government agency internal network may have access to sensitive data. Such an envi-
ronment would have a very low tolerance for FN type errors, with the understanding
that an increase in FP type error tolerance would be necessary. Conversely, a public
media server would seek to minimize FP errors, and would likely have a higher toler-
ance for FN errors. Due to this reality, the detection module should be configurable
such that it can be tuned to the performance requirements of the specific application
implementation environment.
3.1.3 Intervention
An effective system must be able to take action against an identified threat. The
action taken must be able to stop or mitigate the harmful effects of the attack and
should provide some sort of attack memory should a similar attack occur in the
21
future. Given a distributed environment, the action taken should include a broadcast
of the attack signature to potentially affected network devices such that other network
devcies may stop or mitigate the attack. The attack mitigation technique should
maximize effect on the targeted threat while minimizing the disruption to normal
(benign) traffic.
3.2 Hypothesis
We aim to meet all core challenges by developing an SOM modified AIS Open-
Flow network application with a monitorization module utilizing native SDN features
in OpenFlow v1.3 to both monitor and intervene. This work hypothesizes that an
SDN environment with OFv1.3 compliant switches is capable of monitoring a cloud
environment’s network to a level sufficient to enable an SOM based AIS network ap-
plication to detect a DDoS attack in progress. The AIS module resides on top of the
OF network controller as a network application. Upon successful detection, the AIS
network application defines a new network policy capable of mitigating the attack
and then instructs the OF controller to enforce the attack mitigation policy. Native
OFv1.3 switches are sufficient to execute the monitorization scheme and mitigation
policy without custom development.
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4. PROPOSAL
This work seeks to support its hypothesis by building a proof-of-concept system.
This system is intended to demonstrate the effectiveness of an OpenFlow v1.3 based
network application in monitoring network traffic and detecting DDoS attacks in
progress, assuming a suitably accurate detection signature is provided by the SOM
module.
4.1 Collaborative Profiling
This project seeks to build its proof-of-concept system using a network-based [12]
detection scheme within an OpenFlow v1.3 switched network. In contrast to tra-
ditional ingress switch or destination-based methods, network-based [12] methods
compile traffic data from many distributed traffic monitors. To take advantage of
OpenFlow’s strength in centrally handling distributed network architectures, it pro-
poses the monitorization scheme be based on OpenFlow flow statistics collection
native to the protocol.
The proposed framework develops a collaborative traffic monitoring model for
attack detection, shown in figure 4.1. In it, each OF switch features a profile extractor
that collects flow statistics for a subset of the network traffic flowing through the
switch. The profile extractor is implemented as a low table ID, high priority flow table
entry, and does not perturb any network traffic flowing through the switch. The OF
switch collects the desired traffic data according to native OpenFlow matching rules
on fields given in Table 4.3 on page 32. Periodically, a profile aggregation network
application instructs the SDN controller to collect the captured data from each switch,
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then aggregates the data to obtain a global network view of network traffic. In this
way, network-based [12] monitorization is achieved and the monitorization primary
challenge is met.
Fig. 4.1. Collaborative traffic analysis model.
4.2 Toxicity
The nature of DDoS attacks is to overwhelm a computing resource. If a sufficient
amount of traffic arrives at the attack target within a defined period of time, the
destination becomes overwhelmed and inaccessible. This concept of time is very
important, as 10Mb of network traffic in ten seconds is a very different task to handle
than 10Mb in one millisecond. Native OpenFlow flow statistics are able to give precise
packet counts, byte counts, and even average bitrates. While these figures may be
able to give a good instantaneous snapshot of network traffic, they alone are not
enough to track the overwhelming effects of time sustained abuse. To track a flow’s
capacity to overwhelm, we define a function of time: toxicity.
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Fig. 4.2. Example of the toxicity level’s linear increasing and expo-
nential decreasing behavior.
A single packet traveling through a network requires a non-zero amount of re-
sources in order to be processed by network devices including switches, wires, routers,
and destination servers. This amount varies based on packet size, L2, L3, and L4 pro-
tocols, etc, and may be quite small per packet, but can accumulate to an overwhelming
amount very quickly. It becomes very useful to think of a packet as containing a fun-
damental amount of inherent toxicity. As more packets travel through a network en
route to a final destination server, the general toxicity of the network increases. As
more requests arrive at a server than it can handle per unit time, the toxicity level
accumulates at a rate proportional to the number and type of packets it is receiving.
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If traffic increases enough, the destination server becomes overwhelmed and becomes
unusable, an event analogous to poisoning. As network traffic subsides, the toxic
effects subside as a function of time as the server is able to clear its queue. Even TCP
SYN flooding fits the model by simply assigning a higher fundamental toxicity value
to the TCP SYN request than a normal TCP, UDP, or ICMP packet. In seeking
to protect a resource from attack, it becomes useful to think about the problem as
trying to keep the resource’s toxicity level from reaching a poisonous threshold. As
general existing IP and SDN monitoring mechanisms are effective in keeping network
infrastructure from being overwhelmed, our focus is on protecting the destination
servers themselves.
Toxicity is modeled by considering how destination servers receive and process
service requests. The amount of fundamental toxicity a flow accumulates with each
packet reception is related to the server’s maximum queue size, the packet size, and
the L4 protocol, but not to the current size of its buffer or queue. Therefore, toxicity
increases with each event. Further, toxicity levels are kept for both packet statistics
and byte statistics, and thus we define two values, τP and tauB for packet toxicity
and byte toxicity, respectively, as,
τP (t) = τP (t−∆t) + bP (t) (4.1)
τB(t) = τB(t−∆t) + bB(t) (4.2)
where τP (t) is the packet toxicity level at time t, ∆t is the elapsed time since the last
toxicity update, and bP (t) is the fundamental packet toxicity deposit amount for this
flow. The byte toxicity calculation follows the same logic as the packet toxicity, and
the deposit equations are given below.








where α and β are configurable constants.
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Toxicity dissipates at a rate relative to the number of packets in the queue left
to be processed and the time to service one request. Since the rate is relative to its







where λ is the exponential decay constant. Combining increasing and decreasing
factors gives the composite function for a flow’s toxicity as a function of time,
τP (t) = τP (t0)e
−λ(t−t0) + bP (t) (4.7)
τB(t) = τB(t0)e
−λ(t−t0) + bB(t) (4.8)
where t0 is the time of the most recent update. In this way, an accurate, configurable
model capable of capturing the ability of a flow to overwhelm a destination server is
developed. An example of the toxicity level’s time series behavior is given in figure
4.2.
4.3 System Architecture
The proposed system architecture is composed of an OF v1.3 SDN NS-3 network,
a Floodlight SDN controller, and an AIS network application module. The OF v1.3
network simulates the behavior of a UDP flood DDoS attack on a single target, and
includes normal background UDP traffic. The NS-3 network features ofswitch13 [38]
OF v1.3 switches that are externally controlled by the Floodlight SDN controller [39]
running in the same Linux user space as the NS-3 simulation. The NS-3 Floodlight
interface is made through a Linux TAP interface [25], whose L2 and L3 addresses NS-
3 associates with the controller through its native ns3::TapBridge module. The AIS
network application module interfaces with the Floodlight controller via HyperText
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Transfer Protocol (HTTP) REpresentation State Transfer (REST) API to monitor
the network and detect DDoS attacks in progress. Figure 4.3 shows the system block
diagram.
Fig. 4.3. System Architecture
The Ais process is given in figure 4.4. The process is split into two logical entities,
the central coordinator is composed of the network controller and network application
(including SOM module), while the distributed detectors are the OF v1.3 switches.
Potential detectors are initially generated by analysis of an initial dataset, and contin-
ually generated by analysis of network traffic. These potential detectors compose the
Self Set. The Self Set undergoes the negative selection training process to become
the Antibody Set, which is then distributed to the appropriate distributed detec-
tor(s). The detectors then collect flow statistics on incoming traffic, and match flow
patterns against their antibody subsets. Flows that do not match antibody patterns
are processed normally according to OpenFlow v1.3 processes, and flow statistics
are periodically gathered and sent to the central coordinator for continued adaptive
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learning. Upon discovering a flow that does match an antibody, the detector alerts
the central coordinator and the expressed antibody is added to the pathogen library.
Fig. 4.4. Ais process.
4.3.1 Network Architecture
The NS-3 network built for this project simulates the behavior of a UDP flood
type DDoS attack converging on a single target. The network features ofswitch13 [38]
switches externally controlled by the Floodlight SDN controller. In keeping with gen-
eral SDN practices, the data and control planes are logically separated into indepen-
dent networks. This type of network in which control signaling is carried in a different
network than user data is called an out-of-band network [40]. Out-of-band networks,
while good general SDN practice, afford the additional benefit of control plane in-
sulation against application-level DDoS attacks. An entire in-band control network
could easily be taken down by an application-level DDoS attack, as the OF control
messages would be dropped due to attack congestion. The control network, also
called the OpenFlow channel, is configured as a single Carrier Sense Multiple Access
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(CSMA) ethernet [41] channel. The OF switch L2 and L3 addresses are configured
within the NS-3 simulation, while the controller L2 and l3 addresses are configured
by the Linux TAP interface, external to the NS-3 environment. Any changes to the
OpenFlow channel topology must be reflected in both the TAP interface and the NS-3
environment. The control plane network topology is given in Figure 4.5.
Fig. 4.5. Network Control Plane Topology
The data plane network topology is contained entirely within the NS-3 environ-
ment. In it, each host is connected to a single switch by a dedicated CSMA ethernet
channel. The dedicated channel allows for high traffic monitor resolution, suitable for
this proof of concept system. The host switches are connected to the target switch
in a star topology, again with dedicated ethernet channels. The target switch then
uses singly dedicated ethernet channels to connect with the destination servers. The
network data plane topology is given in Figure 4.6.
4.3.2 AIS Network Application Data Structure
The AIS Network Application is intended to enable decisions to be made on large
networks which generate encumberingly large volumes of network statistics (meta-
data). As the entirety of this metadata must travel over the limited OpenFlow chan-
nel, care must be taken to minimize the channel bandwidth utilization by the module,
or risk interfering with normal network operations. Further, as network, memory, and
CPU resources are marketable commodities in cloud computing environments, the ap-
plication’s data and processing considerations must also be taken into account. For
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Fig. 4.6. Network Data Plane Topology
the end system, every effort should be made to reduce resource consumption wher-
ever possible. As a result, the proof-of-concept AisTable and associated entries are




Signature [SwitchCountsEntry] Packet Toxicity Byte Toxicity
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The AisTable is a hash table [31], keyed on a hashing of the AisTableEntry::Signature.
Each network profile (see section 4.1) of interest generates a unique Signature and
thus a unique AisTableEntry in the AisTable. Table 4.2 gives the possible fields a
Signature might contain. These fields are developed from the OXM match fields
required by OpenFlow v1.3 specification [14], and represent the maximum view res-
olution the AIS system has into the network. A Signature instance may contain as
many Signature fields as desired, but must contain at least one.
Table 4.2.
Signature fields (required OXM match fields).
Field Description
OXM OF IN PORT Ingress port. Physical or switch-defined logical port.
OXM OF ETH DST Ethernet destination address.
OXM OF ETH SRC Ethernet source address.
OXM OF ETH TYPE Ethernet type of the OpenFlow packet payload.
OXM OF IP PROTO IPv4 or IPv6 protocol number
OXM OF IPV4 SRC IPv4 source address.
OXM OF IPV4 DST IPv4 destination address.
OXM OF IPV6 SRC IPv6 source address.
OXM OF IPV6 DST IPv6 destination address.
OXM OF TCP SRC TCP source port.
OXM OF TCP DST TCP destination port.
OXM OF UDP SRC UDP source port.
OXM OF UDP DST UDP destination port.
Due to the collaborative nature of the network-based [12] monitorization scheme, a
single Signature may receive traffic data contributions from separate switches through-
out the network. To allow for this, the AisTableEntry includes an array of Switch-
CountsEntries, with a unique SwitchCountsEntry belonging to a single switch for the
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given profile. The SwitchCountsEntry keeps track of packet and byte counts for the
individual flow, and the timestamp when these network statistics were last collected.
These data are necessary and sufficient to calculate the toxicity contributions per
time aggregation event as part of the calculation of equation 4.7. The structure of
the SwitchCountsEntry is given in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3.
SwitchCountsEntry fields
SwitchID Timestamp Packet Count Byte Count
4.3.3 AIS Network Application Architecture
The AIS network application is built as a Python [42] module on top of the
Floodlight SDN controller. The controller - AIS module communication is done via
HTTP REST API calls over a Linux TAP interface. The software architecture is
written to be modular, easy to read, and easy to maintain and extend. The module
is written according to good model-view-controller (MVC) [43] software architectural
pattern practices to ensure the user cannot manipulate AIS data directly, but can
only check status information and trigger module communication events. The AIS
network application architecture is given in Figure 4.7.
At regular intervals, the AIS module’s FlowEntryReceiver polls the controller for
network flow statistics. Upon receiving the request for flow statistics, the controller
sends an OF read-state TCP message to each of its NS-3 OF v1.3 switches through
the dedicated OpenFlow channel. The switches reply with the accumulated statistics
kept for each entry in their flow tables, which the controller then forwards back to
the FlowEntryReceiver as HTTP GET JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [44] data.
These JSON switch flow statistics are then passed to the Ais module through the
Ais::Communicator::FlowEntryReceiver. The JSON data is then parsed and filtered
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Fig. 4.7. Application Architecture
according to profile signature data stored within the Ais module. This allows only
the profile statistics to be sent to the AisTable for toxicity updates. As part of the
toxicity update process, the toxicity values are checked against the profile’s toxicity
thresholds. If toxicity thresholds have been surmounted, the AisTableEntry generates
an appropriate hazard message. In accordance with project goals, the module takes
no further action, though it does have the ability to define a new network policy
which drops packets associated with the attack-classified profile. Implementation
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of the SOM detector generator module is not within the purview of this project,




This chapter describes the experimentation designed to support the project’s hy-
pothesis. Included are descriptions of the experiment’s topology, and specific limiting
implementation challenges. Further, experiment results and analysis are presented
that demonstrate support of the hypothesis.
5.1 Description
The project experimentation is designed to demonstrate the AIS application’s
nature as a network-based [12] AIS and its capabilities of meeting the monitorization
and detection primary tasks. To accomplish these, experimentation is built on the
integration of several software modules within a single Linux userspace, as described
in chapter 4. The experimentation consists of a series of separate 900 second network
traffic simulations in which network configuration and traffic patterns are generated
by the NS-3 network as input, and the AIS module toxicity and hazard message
responses are recorded as output. The project hypothesis is supported if:
1. Monitorization: the AIS is able to aggregate the distributed profile information
into a network-based [12] global view of traffic.
2. Detection: the AIS is able to outperform destination-based detection methods
for a sufficiently realistic simulated DDoS attack in the measured performance
indicator metrics.
36
The NS-3 component gives the ability to simulate representatively realistic net-
work traffic in order to test network configurations, external SDN controllers, and
SDN network applications. To test the monitorization and detection capabilities of
the AIS network application, the network of figures 4.5 and 4.6 is created. Two
experimental traffic scenarios are then run.
5.1.1 Baseline Gathering Experiment Description
The first experiment develops a baseline for DDoS detection, and delineates the
differences between network-based [12] and destination-based detection method per-
formance. In this scenario, even numbered IP addressed hosts send a normal amount
of UDP application traffic to the attack target and are to be classified as benign.
Odd numbered IP addressed hosts begin by also sending a normal amount of UDP
application traffic, but ramp up the amount of individual traffic as the simulation
progresses. The input traffic patterns can be seen in figure 5.5. The simulation is
run four times, with different attack types at the network level and different net-
work monitoring techniques at the network application level. Scenarios tested are
DoS attack with destination-based monitoring, DDoS attack with destination-based
monitoring, DoS attack with network-based [12] monitoring and DDoS attack with
destination-based monitoring. Results are given in section 5.3.1.
5.1.2 Profile Gathering Experiment Description
The second experiment feeds a more realistic traffic pattern to the system. In this
experiment, a second destination is created, and is not the subject of an attack. Nor-
mal application UDP traffic flows from even numbered IP hosts to both the benign
destination server and to the attack target. This traffic serves as background noise for
the DDoS detection module, and should be neither detected as attack traffic nor dis-
rupted as part of any attack mitigation efforts. This normal application traffic starts
shortly after the simulation begins, and steadily continues through the simulation.
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Attack application UDP flood traffic flows from odd numbered IP hosts to the attack
target. As all host clients generate the same amount of individual network traffic, no
single IP source address can be categorized as malicious. These flows come online in
regular intervals, and reach warning and alert level thresholds at well defined times.
It is the end goal of the project to be able to classify subflows within the detected
flows, and filter out specific IP sources as a result. It is this ability that the SOM
module is intended to provide, and thus is not required here.
However, a demonstration of the subflow classification behavior is possible before
the SOM module is developed. This behavior is available through the concept of bit-
mapping. OpenFlow v1.3 flow tables support arbitrarily bit-masked IP address match
fields [14]. This allows flow table entries to match IP source addresses to specific bit
patterns, rather than specific or wildcarded full addresses. These bit patterns can
be generated randomly, and can go through a negative-selection training process in
a “pseudo-SOM” module, with the bitmasks taking the role of detector. In following
along the SOM AIS process, the selected bitmasks can be given to the AIS module.
Once there, the AIS module can instruct the SDN controller to monitor IP addresses
matching the bit pattern, rather than monitoring specific IP addresses or subnetworks.
In this experiment, the pseudo-SOM module has generated such a bitmask, and the
results of its use are given in section 5.3.2.
5.2 Implementation Challenges
In designing the experiments to support the project hypothesis, NS-3’s inherent
limitations as a discrete time event driven simulator place restrictions on real-world
modeling. These limitations include the service request processing problem, discussed
in 5.2.1, and the discrete time leap problem, discussed in section 5.2.2. Since all
network events are software processed, large, highly parallelized networks cannot be
simulated in real time, thus limiting network size. Further, the ofswitch13 module
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is young and not well matured. This module has placed additional constraints on
network experimentation, most importantly the L3 subnetwork problem, discussed in
section 5.2.3.
5.2.1 NS-3 Request Processing Problem
Fig. 5.1. Queueing model for a single server and its network packet buffer.
The service request processing problem concerns the ability of NS-3 to model the
effects of a DDoS attack on network destination servers, which requires a discussion of
queue modeling [45]. In physical destination servers, service requests arrive into the
system as a random process A(t), with interarrival times τ1, τ2, ..., τn. It is sufficient for
this experiment to assume the interarrival times are deterministic. These interarrival





Once in the queue, the requests can then be processed by the server. The time it
takes to process a single request (in our case, a single UDP datagram) is the service
time, and is given by X. The rate at which the server can process service requests is





Here, again, it is sufficient for this experiment to assume a deterministic processing
capacity. The difference between the arrival rate and the processing capacity is the
rate at which the queue’s k-maximum capacity is filled. Once the queue’s length
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reaches its maximum capacity, k, the system can no longer handle incoming service





It is this blocking ratio that fundamentally enables a DDoS attack. The target
system is bombarded with requests until the arrival rate λ >> µ, and the queue
quickly reaches its capacity. At that point, the probability that any given request is
blocked and therefore dropped is near 1, and the system is seen as unreachable.
In order to effectively model a DDoS attack, reception queue modeling must be
implemented. A simple system, as in figure 5.1 is sufficient, though appropriate
values of λ, µ and k must be determined. Further, the simulation environment must
contain a mechanism of implementation. Natively, ns3::CsmaNetDevices undertake
no such reception queue rate modeling, and do not contain a reception queue of any
type [46]. As a result, incoming requests are serviced by the simulated application
server as quickly as the simulator’s hardware allows, independent of network virtual
time. This leads to a restrictively high µ value. Thus, in order to simulate a DDoS
attack, packets must arrive into the simulated target system at a greater rate than
the simulation hardware’s CPU can processs the packets. Recall that NS-3 is an event
driven system, and that each event must be processed in series. Thus, in order for a
DDoS attack to be modeled, the simulator must generate, send, receive, and process
network traffic faster than its own hardware. It is therefore impossible for the effects
of a DDoS attack on a server to be simulated without further NS-3 development to
support the concept of reception queueing.
Development of appropriate reception queue modeling involves the addition of
a reception queue to the ns3::CsmaNetDevice class. This reception queue contains
configurable parameters for service processing capacity µ and buffer length k. As
a result, this project experimentation defines an appropriate µ such that attack-
level traffic causes the malicious effects of a DDoS attack on the target server, while
allowing the target server to process network traffic under this level. Thus, in order
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to support the project’s hypothesis, the AIS module must be able to detect when
this level of network traffic is reached, preferably before the target server is actually
rendered unreachable.
5.2.2 NS-3 Wall Clock Implementation
NS-3 is a discrete event simulator processing events in order from an event queue.
Its virtual clock (simulated network time) progresses as a series of discrete steps,
taking the value of the next event in the queue. Care has been taken to intelligently
add events to the event queue such that network time is never allowed to advance
backward, as in the physical world. However, due to its discrete nature, time leaps are
possible in the simulator which much be avoided. For example, if the network clock
is at time 10.0, and the next event is scheduled for time 18.4, the network clock will
simply be advanced to 18.4 once the event at time 10.0 is finished processing. This is
done without waiting the 8.4 second difference. This behavior must be avoided if the
NS-3 simulation is to interact with an external entity like the Floodlight controller.
NS-3 does support a realtime operating mode in which these discrete time steps do
not occur. This realtime module, however, contains inherent weaknesses that must be
overcome in order for the project to progress. First, the network clock always begins
at time 0. While this is sufficient to keep time, model events, and even handle some
external communication, it is not suited to situations in which a timestamp must be
passed in any sort of message. As this work may require current network time to
be included in controller and/or AIS messages, and the module is not being actively
developed, the work of this project must address this issue.
Time systems based on the UNIX Epoch [47] feature a counter-based clock concept
which counts the number of seconds (or nanoseconds) elapsed since January 1, 1970.
Linux systems concept of time revolves around the UNIX Epoch, and it is this clock
that represents the real-world or realtime clock in this system. The NS-3 virtual
(network) clock features a similar counter-based concept. It is an unsigned 64 bit
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Fig. 5.2. NS-3 Wall Clock Problem seeks to shift the virtual clock up
to a level such that the virtual and real clocks are equal.
integer representing the number of nanoseconds elapsed since the simulation began.
This sets a network time resolution down to the nanosecond level, which is sufficient
for this project. However, due to Epoch concept, it also entails that any external entity
receiving timestamps from the simulation will think the timestamp came from 1970.
Further, the native realtime module is catastrophically inaccurate. In testing with
the SDN DDoS network built for this project, the realtime module lost approximately
9 seconds in one hour. This accuracy is insufficient for a network simulation that is
intended to run multiple days or weeks.
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The NS-3 realtime synchronization module was written inherently expecting the
virtual clock to begin at 0. As a result, a significant portion of the production
module had to be rewritten, and considerable research and developmental effort went
into successfully solving the wall clock problem. Now complete, the new module is
accurate to within 200 milliseconds per hour: a vast improvement and an accuracy
that is within acceptable tolerance for this project. A visualization of the concept is
given in figure 5.2.
5.2.3 NS-3 OpenFlow v1.3 Support (L3 Subnet Problem)
NS-3 has support for two OpenFlow switch specifications, a native OFv1.1 im-
plementation [24], and an external module, ofswitch13 [38] which supports OFv1.3.
Project study reveals that the native implementation is not well developed, and that
the ofswitch13 module is superior. Though stronger than the native implementation,
the ofswitch13 module is immature, and is under continued development.
The limiting ofswitch13 factor concerns the implementation of the ns3::CsmaNetDevice
object. The CsmaNetDevice is the NS-3 equivalent of a physical ethernet Network
Interface Card (NIC). In physical networks, ethernet NICs allow network elements to
communicate via IEEE 802.3 [41]. Inherent in this communication is the ability to
listen for channel activity and send, receive, and propagate L2 traffic. Further, these
abilities are independent of inclusion in OpenFlow networks. A terminal network host
is oblivious to the question of whether or not it resides within an OpenFlow network.
However, ofswitch13 implementation details do not partition the ns3::CsmaNetDevices
in this way. Instead, host CsmaNetDevices, which should be oblivious to the Open-
Flow details, are affected by the installation of the ofswitch13 module. This affect
is not intended by the ofswitch13 developers, and results in a loss of the ability to
send, receive, and propagate L2 traffic in the normal way. The effect is felt in net-
work activity as an inability for host terminal equipment to send IP packets to a
destination not within the sender’s subnetwork. Upon investigation, it is determined
43
that the problematic behavior is due to the module’s poor design and speedy devel-
opment cycle. Specifically, the ofswitch13’s CsmaNetDevice redirects all packets to
be processed by the OpenFlow logic, overwriting the necessary callbacks that allow
the packet to be processed by the IP stack. As a result, the experimental network for
this project cannot contain multiple IP subnetworks.
5.3 Results
Results are now given which lend support to the hypothesis that a network-
based [12] AIS is capable of detecting and mitigating DDoS attacks in cloud com-
puting environments. These results center around the detection performance indica-
tors detection rate (DR) [26] [30], accuracy (A), precision (P) [26] [30], and F-score











TP + TN + FP + FN
(5.6)




2 ∗ TP + FP + FN (5.7)
DR represents the proportion of malicious packets the system is able to detect
to all of the malicious packets in the system. Precision captures the likelihood that
a packet detected as malicious truly is malicious. Accuracy represents the ability of
the system to properly classify a packet as benign or malicious, and the F-score is
a composite score that is used as a single “goodness metric”. These performance
metrics are composed of the four detection event types. Recall,
1. True Positive (TP)– the system detected an event that occurred
2. False Positive (FP)– the system detected an event that did not occur
3. True Negative (TN)– the system did not detect an event that did not occur
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4. False Negative (FN)– the system did not detect an event that occurred
Central to the functioning of the AIS system is the correct implementation of
the toxicity concept of section 4.2. Figure 5.3 gives the detailed behavior of the im-
plemented toxicity level’s behavior in unit testing. The figure displays the project’s
Ais::Toxicity class’s behavior when the deposit amounts b(t) are independent uniform
random variables (top) and deterministic (bottom). Both tests feature a deposit inter-
arrival time that is deterministic, i.e.- independent random variables with a constant
distribution.
Fig. 5.3. Results of unit testing of the Ais::Toxicity Python class.
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5.3.1 Baseline Gathering Experiment
The baseline gathering experiment feeds normal, attack pattern 1 (pattern 1),
and attack pattern 2 (pattern 2) input traffic to the dual monitorization techniques
of destination-based and network-based [12] monitoring. The AIS network application
is fully configurable and provides both methods for testing purposes. Input traffic
patterns can be seen in figure 5.4.
Fig. 5.4. Baseline gathering experiment destination channel traffic patterns.
In the pattern 1 simulation, a combination of normal and pattern 1 traffic patterns
are given, as described in section 5.1.1. As can be seen in figure 5.5, the pattern 1
toxicity values follow pattern 1 input traffic in both pattern and magnitude, though a
detection time gap of 6.2 seconds does occur. Similarly, the pattern 2 traffic detection
patterns closely follow the pattern 2 input traffic pattern. Notice the pattern 2 toxicity
values are lower than the pattern 1 traffic values for the same period. This is expected
as the destination-based method does not aggregate the traffic, but only examines a
single flow.
Similarly, the pattern 1 traffic detection matches the output of the destinatin-
based method. These results are expected, as destination-based monoitoring methods
are perfectly capable of detecting single source anomalous traffic. The difference is in
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Fig. 5.5. Toxicity level results of baseline experiment.
the DDoS traffic detection. Though the overall network-based [12] and destination-
based patterns match closely with each other, notice the large difference in magnitude.
Since the network-based [12] method is able to aggregate a global view of network
traffic, it is able to detect that the attack target is receiving a very high amount of
network traffic, even while each individual flow may be below the single flow alert
threshold.
Pattern 1 performance indicators for this experiment are given in table 5.1, which
compares the two monitorization methods directly. Here, it should be noticed that
overall performance is approximately identical for the two monitoring methods. The




Base TP TN FP FN DR P A F
Destination 16698 17230 0 363 97.897 100.0 98.948 98.925
Network 17034 16951 0 458 97.382 100.0 98.670 98.673
is obtained by considering a 5.0 second AIS poll time and 3.6 millisecond interarrival
time. Similarly, the TN and FN are within this margin of error. As a result, network-




Base TP TN FP FN DR P A F
Destination 0 130850 0 54712 0 0 70.516 0
Network 53648 109557 22689 270 99.500 70.278 87.670 82.374
Pattern 2 performance indicators, by contrast, do illustrate the performance gains
offered by network-based [12] methods, and are given in table 5.2. Here it is seen that
the destination-based method is unable to detect any malicious activity, thus both
TP and FP event counters are zero. This gives a DR of 0 for this method, which is
insufficient for the needs of cloud computing environments. Its accuracy of over 70%
is deceptively high, as the majority of packets sent in this experiment are benign and
thus should be counted in the “negative” event category. In examining the network-
based [12] results, it should be noticed that the DR is above 99% and the accuracy
above 87%. Though these figures are encouraging, it must be remembered that the
AIS is configured for a low FN tolerance. This configuration results in the significant
number of FP events seen, and the resulting precision is an ineffective 70%. Future
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development of the SOM module should reduce these FN events, and raise both the
accuracy and precision of the system. Nevertheless, the network-based [12] method
thoroughrly outperforms the destination-based method, and the hypothesis is sup-
ported by this experiment. Moving forward, destination-based monitoring methods
are not considered.
5.3.2 Profile Gathering Experiment
The profile gathering experiment features the same network-based [12] AIS, and
largely the same network configurations as the baseline gathering experiment. How-
ever, it differs in that it includes a benign destination server. This new server receives
a steady amount of benign UDP application traffic throughout the simulation from
each of its hosts. The benign destination has the IP address 10.1.1.11, while the at-
tack target has the IP address 10.1.1.10. This experiment examines the performance
of two detection profiles on this new traffic scenario.
The first, WILDCARD, offers the simple network-based [12] detection featured
in the previous experiment. Its IP source address field is wildcarded, resulting in
this profile being unable to classify subflows or monitor specific IP source addresses.
The second, BITMASK, offers the pseudo-SOM bitmask concept discussed in section
5.1.2, and is expected to outperform WILDCARD. The AIS is seeded with these
detection profiles in turn and identical network simulations are run on each.
Figure 5.6 gives the details of the WILDCARD profile experiment. Total network
traffic is shown, as is a breakdown of traffic by destination, at the furthest resolution
offered by the profile. Each plot in the figure features ALERT and down lines, which
illustrate the time at which the AIS detected an incipient attack and the time at which
the target server was taken down by the attack. The accumulated total number of
positive detection events is also shown. Packet and toxicity curves are given next,
with the general patterns closely following the input traffic patterns.
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Fig. 5.6. WILDCARD Single profile with no profile bitmasking.
The results of the BITMASK profile are given in figures 5.7 and 5.8. It runs an
identical NS-3 network configuration, so the network input traffic is the same. In
the same method as the previous, this traffic is broken down by destination at the
furthest resolution offered by the profile. It should be noticed that BITMASK is able
to distinguish subflows within the 10.1.1.10 flow: 10.1.1.10 A (attack) and 10.1.1.10 B
(benign). The accumulated packet detections are given as well, and when compared
against WILDCARD’s result, show a more shallow linear slope as a result of its fewer
detection events.
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Fig. 5.7. BITMASK Profile gathering experiment results with pseudo-
SOM supplied profile bitmask.
The toxicity figures illustrate the real benefit of this model. The benign subflow
on the attack target does not surpass the alert threshold, and thus is not detected as
malicious. The attack subflow, however, does, as is detected as malicious a result.
Table 5.3.
Profile gathering performance indicators
TP TN FP FN DR P A F
WILDCARD 28864 118669 23092 1100 96.329 55.555 85.902 70.469
BITMASK 28870 141587 0 1062 96.452 100.0 99.381 98.194
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Fig. 5.8. BITMASK Profile gathering experiment results with pseudo-
SOM supplied profile bitmask, detail.
This experiment’s performance indicator results are given in table 5.3. As can
be seen, the number of TP events is the same (the 6 packet difference is negligible)
for the two detection profiles. The FN events with both profiles are associated with
the 10 second detection time lag as a result of the AIS’s polling period and toxicity
deposit amount configuration. The great benefit of the BITMASK profile lies in the
number of FP events. WILDCARD’s wildcarded IP source field results in over 23000
FP events, giving a precision of only 56%. This inadequate performance is expected
here, as it cannot distinguish subflows with such a wildcard when traffic levels per
host are identical. Thus, WILDCARD cannot distinguish an attacking host from a
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benign host within a flow. BITMASK, however, can, thanks to its inclusion of the
bitmasking pseudo-SOM. As a result, it creates 0 FP events and properly classifies
WILDCARD’s 23000 FPs as TN. This proper classification gives BITMASK perfect
precision and an accuracy limited only by the polling period, greatly supporting the
project’s hypothesis.
Other works by Hong [30] and Jha and Archaya [26] have measured the same
metrics for similar work, which is compared in table 5.4. The highest obtained F-
scores are included here for comparison. It should be noted that the experiments vary
here, and therefore the results of comparison should be taken lightly.
Table 5.4.






6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This work is intended to function as the laying of a foundational proof of concept for
the proposed AIS network application system described in section 4. As demonstrated
in section 5.3.2, when given a perfect profile, the AIS system can express perfect
behavior, and thus is limited only by the strength of its detector generation method.
Therefore, the hypothesis of this experimental proof of concept is well supported and
should be extended.
The primary area of focus for future work should be on the development of the
SOM module for the AIS network application. The development of this module would
allow many of this project’s assumptions to be removed and would allow the AIS to
fully function as it was intended. The AIS network application is fully ready to accept
network profiles from such an SOM module, so this development can focus on the
SOM itself. The implementation details of the SOM module are not constrained by
the AIS network application, and thus the SOM module can be implemented using
any tool most suited to the task. The SOM generated profiles can be passed to the
AIS network application through any usual application communication means, such
as interprocess communication (IPC) [48]. If the developers of the SOM module
choose to implement it in Python, minimal integration effort will be required, and
the SOM can simply function as a separate thread/ process within the application.
Though the development of the SOM module will contribute mightily to the overall
goals of the project, challenges remain that will limit its efficacy and accuracy. These
challenges should be co-developed with the SOM module, as they are not logically
connected and can be developed in parallel. These challenges include coordinating
with the developers of the ofswitch13 module [38] to refine ns3::CsmaNetDevice mod-
eling to solve the L3 Subnet Problem of section 5.2.3. Rectifying this problem will
allow for a much more complex and realistic SDN network to be developed in NS-3.
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Not only will this result in more applicable real-world simulations, but it will also
provide for a better training environment for the SOM module. Development of this
ofswitch13 module requires detailed knowledge of OpenFlow v1.3, general network-
ing concepts, and strong C++ development skill. It is possible the developers of the
module will solve this problem themselves, but it is not guaranteed.
The final workstream to be extended in the future is the development of realis-
tic and complete NS-3 service request modeling, as discussed in section 5.2.1. The
development of realistic µ values for destination terminal equipment packet service
modeling would allow for the desired real-world effects of DDoS attacks on application
servers to be modeled in NS-3 and a high analyzation resolution would result. This
modeling must be able to account for load on the server, packet protocol, available
server memory, etc. This sort of analyzation will be necessary before any potential
AIS system is fully tested, so future developers will need this capability in testing.
Development of this modeling feature requires detailed knowledge of NS-3, principles
of queue modeling and random variables, and strong C++ development skill.
Future parallel development of these three workstreams is recommended, as the
results of this paper demonstrate that a network-based AIS SDN network application
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